Emerging Technologies: Implications for International Security & New Zealand

Twitter: @ReubenSteff

I just returned from a week of research in Washington DC. The topic of my focus was the implications of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, quantum computing and digitization technologies on international security (broadly defined), how we can begin to conceptualise and understand this emerging technological era, and what it means for small states like New Zealand. 

While my research will be sifted through in more detail to inform a broader program of research myself and my colleague, Dr Joe Burton, have underway at the University of Waikato, below I outline a number of points I think worth sharing now. I hope that readers forgive the scattered approach of this article, I am really just beginning to scratch the surface - subsequent blog posts, publications and other research outposts will delve into various issues noted below (and many not noted here) in more detail.

As a framing device for this blog post, it should be understood that we are living through the first wave of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and it will be the complex interaction of a number of new technologies that may very well end up posing the greatest threat to international security and stability, and pose vexing issues for global governance. While much analysis at this stage is speculative, we know from past industrial revolutions that it will have positive and negative implications for practically every sphere of human activity (economic, social, environmental, political, cultural, ideological and national security) and thus it's vitally important we start turning our attention to these issues.

As a quick 'signpost' for readers, sections below include: (1) defining emerging technologies, (2) categories (and sub-categories) of emerging technologies, (3) practical issues of 'convergence', (4) the importance of AI, an emergent AI 'arms race' and cyber, (5) quantum computing, (6) the implications for US-China competition (and other reflections), (7) what this means for small states like New Zealand and (8) the need for a research program.

Defining Emerging Technologies

• No common definition of ‘emerging technologies’ exists. It is often used to:
• Refer to a variety of new technologies just released on the market;
• New features of existing technologies or those that have existed for some time but are now reaching maturity;
• Promising ‘game changing’ technological research underway and research projects that could have a massive payoff in the long-term (for example quantum computing)
• These technologies will not remain separate from one another – they will interact with existent technologies in a mutually synergistic fashion – and overlap and converge with one another in an existent-emergent technological ecosystem (more on this below). 
• Naturally, what is new in one context may be old in another. For example, the internet is still only making its way into the deepest recesses of Africa and Asia, and only in recent years have policymakers begun to consider the implications of some emerging technologies for national security that have existed for some time (such as 3D printing and nanotechnology).

Categories (and sub-categories) of Emerging Technologies

The panoply of technologies that fits into the broad three-pronged definition of emerging technologies outlined above is immense. It helps to break down the technologies into classes of technology, and then to recognize that in each class there are subsets. A few of the major classes: 

• Artificial Intelligence (AI)
• Additive manufacturing (3D printing)
• Nanotechnology
• Robotics
• Biotechnology
• Digitisation ('Big Data')

A range of subset technologies sit under these major classes. For example, consider that the class of '3D printing' (this link contains a good breakdown of a number of these classes of technology) breaks down into:

• Bioprinting
• Carbon Fiber Printing
• Material Extrusion
• Material Jetting
• Microreactor Printing
• Powder Bed Fusion

The point here is simply to illustrate that what at first glance look like singular technologies - i.e. nanotech, biotech or AI - actually contain large sets of technologies, complicating analytical efforts.

Some other takeaways:

• These emerging technologies are smaller, rely on digital connectivity and are cheaper than their predecessors.
• Data and the internet are the fuel and 'connective tissue' of these technologies
• The rapid and unpredictable pace of technological change means that technologies are rapidly outstripping regulations.
• The natural trajectory of many of these technologies is towards more autonomy from human control and, indeed, one person I discussed this issue with said the desire to keep humans 'in the loop' (ensuring humans have have a final 'say' over, for example, the most critical decisions autonomous robotics will make on future battlefields) is a pipe dream and the sooner we adjust to the reality that full autonomy will be granted to a number of physical and cyber systems in the future, the sooner we will be able to have a more realistic conversation about them.
• A major difference from past periods of technological change (as it applies to military technology) is that, at least for now, the leading agents of change are not in the US government or military - they are businesses in the private sector which are driven by different (commercial) imperatives.
• Emerging technologies empower actors beyond the state, facilitate economic, political and ideological connectivity between individuals and sub-national groups, and are ripe with asymmetric potentialities that disruptive actors will seek to utilise
• We will need a deeper and wider understanding of the nature of power in this new era. To take a cue from Anne-Marie Slaughter's recent book The Chessboard and the Web, power now extends beyond traditional forms (military economic and political) to network-derived powers, such as “civilian power,” “convening power,” and “information power”.

Practical Issues of Convergence

• To make it conceptually manageable, we tend to think of technologies individually but this misses the point that these technologies will converge with one another. We can think of a technological ‘ecosystem’ where a range of organisms -  in this case emerging technologies - interact to mutually accelerate and synergise.
• As such, we should conceptualise emerging technologies as being cross-domain, cross-discipline and crossing over categories of knowledge. As Natasha Bajema puts it: “Convergence refers to the synergistic integration of new technologies, each of which advances at a rapid rate and interacts with more established fields, leading to increasing complexity and the blurring and redefining of boundaries.”
• While convergence offers immense promise, it also represents a significant practical challenge for governments, the national security sector, researchers and educators seeking to understand and harness these technologies, since organisationally they are all broken down into silos. For example, few experts on machine learning - an AI technology - will also have expertise and be working with nanotechnologies and biotechnologies, despite the fact these technologies will converge in the years to come. 
• Individuals and organisations will have to learn how to utilise emerging technologies simultaneously. And how do we do that? How do we train our students in school to use them in an integrated fashion - let alone policymakers or the military? At the bare minimum we need to recognise this issue and that the countries and organisations that can operate technologies in an integrated fashion will gain an initial advantage. 

The Importance of AI, an Emergent AI 'arms race' and Cyber

• In the near term, AI (and especially Machine Learning, an application of AI where machines/software are fed data to 'learn' for themselves) is likely to be the most consequential for international security and the global balance of power. In the long term Quantum Computing has perhaps the most potential. The former is addressed below first.
• AI is in the position nuclear weapons were 80 years ago: a technology with such vast implications that no major, and perhaps even minor, state can afford to be left behind, and one where an incipient arms race is underway (the statement by Putin in 2017 that "the nation that leads in AI ‘will be the ruler of the world’" characterizes a widely-held belief). 
• Given the omnipresent existence of networks that facilitates practically every modern human endeavour, data is now becoming one of the key currencies of power. Those states that can make sense of it faster than others will have a massive strategic and military advantage:
• Imagine a state wants to acquire a picture of the strategic infrastructure - say spaced-based satellite networks - of it's competitors and enemies. Well, you could use AI algorithms to synthesize massive amounts of data covering image recognition of space-based platforms, manifests and other data hacked and stolen to establish an accurate picture;
• Or you could try track every US submarine by using data to find where they are at any given in time;
• Find the weakness and vulnerabilities of elected officials you want to influence;
• Find entry points into human and cyber networks. The list goes on and on.

• As stated above, the trajectory of many of these technologies is towards more autonomy from human control, and this goes for AI algorithms. Consider that some stock market 'blips' (small downturns) in recent years were caused, in significant part, by algorithms now used by financial institutions designed to make investment decisions faster and 'better' than humans. In theory, algorithms could set off a financial crash simply by operating how they were designed to: maximize profit. Unless they are embued wuth 'AI-ethics' - i.e. earn money but do not crash the NASDAQ - the likelihood of such outcomes will grow, and in a competitive situation the short-term incentives are to not restrain their behaviour. This could apply to the use of autonomous systems on the battlefield.
• Furthermore, given the complexity of a competitive 'ecosystem', like financial markets, it is very difficult for us to study, observe and understand the interaction of algorithms in them (we mainly just see the outcomes) or how the insertion of a new algorithm can affect the systemic stability of the industry as a whole.
• Finally, it has been well documented by now but the cyber domain poses one of the largest challenges to modern states. In other domains there are rules of engagement and war, conventions, and repercussions if states cross 'red lines'. This doesn't exist with cyber. 
• And while the ability to attribute the source of attacks is improving, raising the prospects that deterrent threats can be tailored to disruptive actors, perhaps the hardest issue at the moment is knowing whether an attack is criminal or comes from an organised nation state.
• Given virtually all these emerging technologies will be connected to the internet, cyber security will continue to grow in importance, as will data reliability. Consider, if we are going to feed Machine Learning algorithms with larger and larger amounts of data to crunch and guide our decision making, then we need to ensure the data we are feeding them is accurate. Outside actors may very well seek to feed us dubious or erroneous information ('fake data'?) that we'll pass onto our systems and programs, leading to sub-optimal - and even self-destructive - outcomes.

Quantum Computing

In the long term, Quantum Computing is the technology with the most profound potential for causing transformation and disruption, and one where international competition is fierce. For now, I'll just briefly touch upon it here.

• The essence of Quantum Computers is that they will allow computers to undertake multiple calculations simultaneously - computer power will drastically outstrip those of modern computers.
• These computers will have incredible abilities to acquire and sift through global streams of data (including encrypted data), affording those states that get them first an unprecedented ability to monitor global interactions and positioning.
• Everything from transnational organised crime financial transactions, to cross-national movements by terrorists, to the positions of military personnel and hardware has a digital signature on a network somewhere.
• A fully operational quantum computer could allow the user to access the entire set of data across the planet. If you were a nuclear power you could instantaneously acquire the global position of every nuclear submarine of your adversary, the location of every nuclear missile and silo, every nuclear bomber, the location of every military base, space based satellites, etc. The implications for strategic stability in such a world could be momentous.

The Implications for US-China Competition

• How will these technologies affect international competition at the state level and, in particular, US-China relations (given my recent research - see here and here - most of you will know the US-China competition, and it's implications for NZ, is a major focus of mine). 
• As a backdrop, tension between Washington and Beijing has been escalating in recent months. Indeed, a level of heightened competition was formalised in the recent US National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defence Strategy (NDS) that elevated China to a ‘strategic competitor.’ The NSS asserts that Beijing has adopted "an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future." 
• [As an aside if you think this is view just indicative of the Trump-led White House, bear in mind that James Mattis was considered to be a bipartisan pick and one a democratic Clinton-led administration would likely have chosen as well].
• How do emerging technologies connect to the US-China competition? Well, emerging technologies are precisely the sphere that most believe will decide whether China or the US reigns 'supreme' in the 21st century.
• Unsurprisingly, AI was identified as the most significant technology in this competition. Despite the fact it could be key to sustaining America's technological edge vis-a-vis China, the US government is not presently organised for this challenge. 
• US agencies and organisations have different priorities to one another and there are very few actors in the system that have responsibility/authority across departments and agencies. As such, no one has authority in the US to create an AI 'grand strategy' that crosses all those departments. 
• This stands in contrast to China, which released a national AI strategic plan last year with the stated intention of gaining a “first-mover advantage” to become “the world’s primary AI innovation center” by 2030. Furthermore, the Chinese government have greater control over the organs of the state and private' business.
• In short, China can act like a symphony on these issues (and is geared up for it) whereas the US system is still figuring out what to do. 

• The Trump administration has in fact proposed cutting investment for research into science and technology! This reflects a suspicion of science in the Trump administration and an over-estimation in the belief that the US private sector will generate AI innovations. Even if US companies can lead innovation, its incentives are to put these on the market (making them accessible to the global public) where they can make the most profit - not to sell them exclusively to the US government and military.
• The American military acquisition process is unwieldy and slow, and the DoD likes to keep capabilities 'in-house' rather than engage and collaborate with US businesses in a concerted way. Additionally, the recent expansion of the US military budget is still directed towards big ticket items - tanks and naval vessels - rather than directed towards the 'art of the possible' - game-changing technologies. 
• The problem of making technology the 'lead' in any national security strategy or military acquisition process is that there is no surety that pursuing emerging technologies will have the intended payoff. It's a gamble. At worst, it becomes an immense waste of funds but, in an era where technology is changing so fast, may be a necessary strategy.
• What could lead the US to initiate a strategic approach that united the US government and private sector in an 'all-of-nation' AI effort? Likely some kind of external shock akin to a 'Sputnik moment'.

The US-China Competition: Other Reflections

• While there is recognition that a US-China technological competition is underway (and the Trump administrations investigations into the practices of Chinese big tech firms suggests the US is preparing to wield the 'stick'), most assessments are that the US does not want another Cold War. Nor, naturally, do they want to be overtaken by China.
• This is a massive issue and dilemma for the US system and it's ability to wage a technological competition with China: while during the Cold War Republican and Democrat governments used different tactics to contain and confront the Soviet Union, the overall strategy was the same – the eventual defeat of the Soviet Union’s Communist ideology. Eternal peaceful coexistence was not possible, and this ensured there was a strategic effort to counter the Soviets. But now the US faces a strategic nightmare: a rising power that does not appear to pose an obvious ideological threat, one that is economically interdependent with the US (constraining US options), and all at a time when the US does not have its house in order or the political will to forge a cross-government strategy in emerging technologies. What defines success in the face of this challenge? The Americans no longer seem to know.

What does this mean for Small States like New Zealand?

• So how do small states (like New Zealand) fit into this new emerging technological world - what can they do to ensure they could readily acquire the newest technologies, be able to effectively use them and what niche capabilities should they themselves seek to become world leaders in?
• A few suggestions:
• Barriers for 'entry' into some technological areas are low and acquisition of new capabilities can be rapid. Furthermore, unlike the development of major technologies in history, a state does not need an immense military-industrial infrastructure to develop algorithms, software, cyber capabilities, etc.
• AI, algorithms, etc, could allow states like NZ to create a competitive edge in niche areas (algorithms for national defence?) if they are willing to invest in them. Nothing is stopping small states except political will and awareness of the opportunities.
• How will we continue to demonstrate value to our key friends and partners. Perhaps New Zealand could undertake a 'market survey' of the niche technological needs of our partners. For example, what technological capabilities does the US or Australia wish it had time to develop but is not currently prioritizing? Could NZ plug that gap? What capabilities is NZ currently strong in and should continue to invest it (and what investments should be deprioritized?) 
• Small states benefit from greater levels of agility vis-a-vis their larger partners, and can create shorter development to employment pathways for new technologies. New Zealand could test out new technologies 'in the field' in short order, derive lessons and effective operating doctrines that can then be shared with friends and partners.
• Some other reflections:
• New Zealand will also need to consider the prospects for international regulation of emerging technologies, where it can lead successful efforts in the multilateral sphere and where attempts to do so could be a waste of time and effort. The feasibility of tight regulations at the moment appears to be low. But it may not be impossible, as fairly successful attempts to ban the use of chemical weapons (notwithstanding recent events in Syria) and some other military technologies attests.
• NZ's future economic prosperity will require an ability to secure access to emerging technologies and information. If tensions between NZ's major security and trade partners increase, it is possible that access to high-technology will become a privileged offering to states that are willing to support their interests (potentially at the expense of the other power).
• Relating to NZ's security ties with our friends and partners, NZ is going to need to stay on top of emerging technologies to ensure it can seize opportunities for combined training, sustain a credible level of regional engagement and ensure military interoperability, including for regional and global humanitarian operations.

The Need to Develop a Domestic Emerging Technologies Research Program

• Past industrial revolutions simply tell us that the Fourth Industrial Revolution will transform many aspects of human activity. Although we are armed with this knowledge, we lack a meaningful understanding of how these emerging and soon-to-be converging technologies will interact with one another in a wider technological ecosystem.
• As such, I think the next step is to begin to a program of research that provides concepts and tools so that our officials, policymakers, academics, students and the public can use as a resource and lens to view the changes taking place, how to understand them and effectively utilize them for the betterment of society and the nation. 
• Owing to the sheer litany of relevant emerging technologies, I propose that we need to follow two vectors of research. 
• One would direct greater analytical focus and research, with the specific New Zealand context in mind, to the most consequential emerging technologies. We should not assume that the uses technologies have overseas will always be replicable or relevant to our shores. Additionally, what are the implications these technologies will have for New Zealand's domestic security (law enforcement and policing efforts - broadly defined - and intelligence gathering and sharing) and to our foreign policy interests at the international, regional, and sub-regional levels?
• Two, we need to develop a pool of expertise in New Zealand that have an understanding of the implications across a spectrum of emerging technologies. Organisational silos (which create a siloisation of thinking) will need to be addressed in practice (not just in rhetoric). Research projects should also, ideally, integrate policymakers into them from the start and have dissemination strategies that ensure findings can get into the hands of decision makers in a timely manner.
• In sum, I think we will need to examine and assess each technology and consider their implications for different spheres of life, as well as try to start understanding what their combined potential will be. This is a formidable task.  

Final note

• So that ends this brain dump. There is much more to be said on all of the above issues (and many others!) and I hope to conduct a deeper dive into these issues with my colleagues in the months and years to come. It is apparent that we, both in New Zealand and abroad, have really not come to grips with the era we are entering but we have to start somewhere and I hope, in some small way, this blog post contributes towards that end.